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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
J. EARL MORRIS, 
vs. 




BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 9217 
Respondent agrees with the Statement of Facts set out 
in Appellants' Brief with the exception that while page 3 of 
Appellants' Brief says that "Plaintiff looked to the South 
once as he crossed the intersection" it does not include 
statements of the Plaintiff (Respondent) concerning his look-
ing before and during his crossing of State Street at said 
intersection. Appellants' Brief quotes Plaintiff's statement 
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that " 'As I was nearing the center of the intersection, I 
looked south,'" but omits Plaintiff's statement that before 
crossing any portion of the intersection, he looked both north 
and south for any approaching traffic. He testified "Well, 
after the light had changed I looked both ways and looked 
from the south and traffic had stopped before I proceeded." 
(R24) Neither does Appellants' Brief acknowledge a state-
ment of the Plaintiff, (Respondent) admittedly indefinite, 
that he looked somewhat to the south as he proceeded past 
the center of the intersection or as he put it, "Well, as I was 
driving across, of course, as you are looking out of the side 
of your car, you can always see to the south a little bit." 
(R3l) 
In other respects, Appellants' Statement of Facts IS 
adequate for the use of Respondent in stating his case. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL JUDGE CORRECTLY FOUND THAT 
PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF NO NEGLIGENCE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL JUDGE CORRECTLY FOUND THAT 
PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF NO NEGLIGENCE. 
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It is axiomatic that a Defendant is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law, only if the evidence and the inferences 
therefrotn, when viewed most favorably to the Plaintiff, would 
not reasonably support a judgment in Plaintiff's favor. In 
the instant case, then, unless all reasonable minds must agree 
that Plaintiff was guilty of negligence and that such negli-
gence proximately contributed to cause his injury, Plain-
tiff was entitled to have the question submited to the jury, 
or, as here, to the Court. 
The issue to be here determined is whether there was 
contributory negligence as a matter of law, on the part of the 
Plaintiff in having entered the intersection as he did and in 
failing to apprehend danger and take steps to prevent in-
jury, and if there was such negligence, was it a proximate, 
contributing cause of the accident. The Utah Supreme 
Court, remarking on the matter of look-out, in the case of 
Spackman vs. Carson, 117 Utah 390, 216 P2d 640, cited by 
Appellant, held that unless all reasonable minds must say 
that the driver of a vehicle did not use due care in the matter 
of look -out under a particular set of circumstances, look -out 
is a question for the jury. 
Plaintiff had the right to proceed into the intersection 
until such time as something appeared to indicate that it 
was not safe to do so. The language of this court, in a 
unanimous holding in a recent, similar case, Johnson vs. 
Maynard, 9 Utah 2d 265, 242 P2d 884, reads: 
"Conceding that the Defendant's emergency 
vehicle was plainly visible to the Plaintiff so she 
could have seen it if she had looked, that does not 
necessarily provide the full answer to the problem of 
contributory negligence under the circumstances here 
shown. A traveller approaching a signal-controlled 
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intersection with the light in her favor, has the right 
of way, and can rely on it until something appears to 
indicate it is not safe to do so. It is, of course, true 
that she cannot assume full protection by the traffic 
light and remain oblivious to cars approaching against 
it." But, said the court, she must pay attention to 
rna:ny other details such as her car, other cars, sig-
nals, pedestrians, and etc. "It is because of these 
numerous hazards and then to facilitate the orderly 
flow of traffic, that traffic lights are installed. They 
permit the. motorist to enter the intersection with some 
assurance of safety when the traffic light is in his 
favor. Being under obligation to divide her atten-
tion to the numerous hazards just adverted to, plus 
the assurance that she might reasonably take from 
the fact that the traffic light was presumably hold-
ing any traffic from entering the intersection from 
the South, the trial court correct! y determined that 
reasonable minds might find that in entering the in-
tersection as the Plaintiff did, she was within the 
limits of due care under the circumstances, and con-
sequently, the question of her contributory negli-
gence was one of fact for the jury." 
The case at bar presents almost an exact fact situation 
with the one above quoted. Two details are different. In 
the Johnson case, the Defendant's car was a police car (on an 
emergency run) and was plainly marked as such. In the case 
here considered, the Plaintiff had no advantage of distinc-
tive markings on Defendants' vehicle to make it more easily 
recognized or apprehended. The Johnson case arose out 
of a collision that occurred during a busy time of day and 
while the Plaintiff there had to concern herself with more 
traffic than in instant case, she had only the same number of 
directions and no more incidental details to watch than 
did the Plaintiff here. 
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Both Plaintiffs entered a signal-controlled intersection 
with the traffic light in their favor. Both were required to 
keep a lookout for other traffic in the same number of 
directions, for pedestrians, signs, signals, and to the operation 
of their own automobile. Both Defendants' speed was about 
40 miles per hour while Plaintiffs were going relatively 
slowly-from a stop to 12 to 15 miles per hour in our pres-
ent case and approximately 5 to 7 miles per hour in the 
Johnson case. In the former instance, Plaintiff was struck 
just as she passed the intersection, while in our present situ-
ation, Plaintiff had completely crossed the highway, and, 
according to the Defendant, Leo Christensen, was actually 
14 feet into 9000 South Street. Having entered the inter-
section after ascertaining that the highway was clear of 
any traffic a pproacing so closely as to constitute an imme-
diate hazard, Plajntiff had completely passed over the 
intersection before being overtaken by Defendants. The 
testimony clearly shows that had the Plaintiff seen the De-
fendants' car, there would have been nothing in its approach 
to alert him of the danger or to suggest that he could not 
rely on the protection of the red light and presume that 
Defendants were about to afford him the right of way to 
which he was then and there entitled. The testimony of 
Defendant, Leo Christensen is that as he was one hundred 
feet from the intersection, he took his foot off the gas pedal 
and began slowing slightly. At 38 feet from the intersec-
tion, he said he began applying his brakes. Nothing in this 
sequence would, in the words of the trial judge, have put the 
Plaintiff "on notice that he had to do something to avoid 
the accident." 
In the case of Martin vs. Stevens, 121 Utah 484, 243 
P2d 747, after having commented on the duty of a Plaintiff 
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to exercise due care in observing for other traffic, Mr. Jus-
tice Crockett says: 
"But in so doing, he had the right to assume, 
and to rely and act on the assumption that others 
would do likewise; he was not obliged to anticipate 
either that other drivers would drive negligently, nor 
fail to accord him his right of way, until in the exer-
cise of due care, he observed, or should have observed, 
something to warn him that the other driver was 
driving negligently or would fail to accord him his 
right of way. If this princi pie is not clear in the 
earlier Utah cases, it is firmly established by the 
more recent expressions of this court." 
In reasoning the case of Martin vs. Stevens, and con-
sidering the cases cited by the Defendant in that case (some 
of which cases are here cited by Defendant) as a basis for 
holding a driver contributorily negligent as a matter of law, 
the language of the court is that 
"In the analysis of each of these cases, one prin-
ciple which distinguishes them from the case at bar 
can be succinctly stated: Each of them was decided 
upon the proposition that the circumstances were 
such that the driver held to be negligent as a matter 
of law, either observed, or in the exercise of due care 
should have observed, the manner in which the other 
driver was approaching the intersection, and clearly 
could, by ordinary reasonable care, have avoided the 
collision. Or to state it in other words, the negli-
gence, or manner of driving of the other driver, was 
such that the driver appraising the situation was 
alerted to it, or by using due care would have been 
so alerted in time so that by the exercise of ordinary 
precaution, he could have avoided the collision. 
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And, in each of these cases, this seemed to the Court 
so clearly manifest, that reasonable minds could not 
find to the contrary." 
The case under consideration must be analyzed upon 
these principles. The testimony is that Plaintiff did not 
see Defendants until the moment of the collision. Plain-
tiff was obviously not alerted to the danger at such a time 
and in such a manner that by the exercise of ordinary pre-
caution he could have avoided the collision. It follows, 
then, under the above princi pies, that we determine whether 
or not the circumstances were such that by using ordinary 
care, the Plaintiff could have been alerted to the danger in 
time to avoid the collision. 
The reason or reasons for which Plaintiff could not 
or did not see Defendants' car, we may not be able to ascer-
tain with certainty under the circumstances of this collision. 
But what seems unequivocally clear, is that the facts sur-
rounding the collision are such that the trier of facts could 
readily find that there was no negligence on the part of the 
Plaintiff, which proximately contributed to the injury, in 
which event, the decision of the lower court should be 
affirmed. 
There is no quarrel with the concept that Plaintiff 
was required to look. This he did at no less than two 
critical points-once before starting across the intersec-
tion, and once as he approached the center of the highway, 
and in addition, as we interpolate certain inept phrasing 
in Plaintiff's testimony, he looked toward the source of 
possible danger as he crossed the second half of the high-
way. This would appear to be the conduct of an "ordinary, 
reasonable, prudent man under the circumstances." It is 
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not merely a matter of how often he looked, but from what 
points and in what direction. And, admittedly, as Plain-
tiff is required to look, he is also required to see. But 
he is obligated to see only what is there to be seen. 
Several factors should be mentioned in this connec-
tion. While daylight was breaking, it was still dark enough 
to require headlights, which were apparently in use on both 
cars, and it was dark enough that the streets were still 
lighted by artificial lighting. Vision is obviously encum-
bered by such circumstances. Then, as Plaintiff approach-
ed the center of the highway, the automobile of witness Lund, 
parked on the inside or left lane of travel going north, 
partial! y obstructed the Plaintiff's view south on State 
Street. Another explanation lies in the ratio of the speed 
of the two vehicles. Plaintiff estimated his speed at im-
pact, at approximately 12 to 15 miles per hour. Assuming 
an approximately uniform rate of acceleration from zero at 
a stop to 13.5 miles per hour, (the mean average of 12 to 
15 miles per hour), Plaintiff's average speed from the 
crosswalk at the west edge of State Street to the point of 
impact, was about 6.75 miles per hour. The Court will 
take notice of the fact, that at this speed it would have 
required approximately 7.07 seconds for Plaintiff to travel 
the distance of 70 feet, which distance appears from all the 
evidence to be the minimum distance travelled by Plain-
tiff from his stopped position at the west edge of State 
Street to the point of impact across the 70 foot wide street. 
The Court will notice also that at the speed of 40 miles per 
hour, as estimated by Defendant, Leo Christensen, he would 
be travelling 59 feet each second. In the 7.07 seconds re-
quired for Plaintiff to traverse 70 feet, Defendants would 
have travelled approximately 417 feet. Taking into ac-
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count his having slowed slightly at 100 feet and again at 38 
feet, at a n1ost conservative estimate, Defendants would have 
been 350 feet from the intersection when Plaintiff started 
across. At the time Plaintiff looked south as he was nearing the 
center of the intersection, Defendants' car would have been 
something more than 175 feet away; just how much more 
depends upon how far Plaintiff was from the center of the 
street when he looked south, coupled with the consider-
ation that Plaintiff ould have consumed more than half of 
this estimated 7.07 seconds (used to cross the entire street) 
as he travelled the first 35 feet from his stopped position to 
the center of the street. While the mathematics here are 
exact, the conclusions drawn are in some instances, admitted-
ly, best estimates. They suggest, however, some of the cal-
culating required by the trier of facts in this instance, 
resulting in judgment for the Plaintiff. It would seem clear 
that in view of all the circumstances, Plaintiff had no duty 
to see danger at that distance, particularly with the addi-
tional limited protection offered by the red light controll-
ing traffic from the south. Quoting again from Johnson vs. 
Maynard: 
"With the assurance that she might reasonably 
take from the fact that the traffic light was presum-
ably holding any traffic from entering the inter-
section from the south, the trial court correct! y 
determined that reasonable minds might find that in 
entering the intersection as the Plaintiff did, she was 
within the limits of due care under the circumstances, 
and consequently, the question of her contributory 
negligence was one of fact for the jury." 
It is noteworthy that none of the cases cited by De-
fendants as a basis for overturning the verdict of the lower 
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court involve a collision at an intersection where the Plain-
tiff had the added protection and continuing assurance of a 
red. light, presumably to control oncoming traffic from either 
side. 
The case of Johnson vs. Syme, 1957, 6 Utah 2d 
319, 313 P2d 468, heavily relied upon by Defendants, is 
clearly distinguishable on its facts from the case at bar. 
In the Johnson case, Defendant's car, although not seen by 
Plaintiff until it appeared directly in front of her at a 
distance of. 20 to 30 feet, had been seen by other motorists 
who were following Plaintiff about a block behind, and 
who "had no difficulty whatever in observing and watch-
ing the whole occurrence, including the decedent's (defend-
ant's) car approach toward the highway from a considerable 
distance along the Draper Road, through the stop sign, into 
the intersection and on to the collision and fatality." P. 
469. 
In instant case, the Defendants' car approached rapid-
ly from the side, from a partially obstructed position, strik-
ing Plaintiff from the side almost as, or in one version of 
the testimony, actually after he had reached the safety of 
the far side of 9000 South. The trial court commented on 
the testimony of Defendant, Leo Christensen, "that the 
Plaintiff had gotten clear through the intersection, 14 feet 
out in 90th South Street and then Mr. Leo. Christensen 
chased him out there and struck him." The difference as 
concerns the Plaintiffs in the two cases is as between closing 
one's eyes to what is clearly in line of vision, almost directly 
ahead and, in being rapidly attacked from a vantage point 
almost (at the time of impact) from behind the possibility 
of vision to the side. 
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Plaintiff submits that the principles set out by the 
Utah Court in Bates vs. Bums, 1955, 3 Utah 2d 180, 281 
P2d 209, are appropriate to the case at bar and that De-
fendants' attempt to distinguish the case on factual dif-
ferences is ineffectual. 
It is true that in the case at bar, Plaintiff did not see 
the Defendants' car, but as indicated by the lower court, 
even had he seen said car, there would have been no rea-
son for him to suppose there was any need for action on 
his (Plaintiff's) part to avoid the collision. To quote from 
Defendant's brief in reference to this case: 
"Cases such as Bates vs. Burns . . . ., allow a 
driver the right of way to proceed without fault into 
a position of peril, even though his lookout might 
have been inadequate, if that driver could reasonably 
have assumed that the other driver would yield to 
h. '' 1m. 
Further, the language of the court in the Bates case is 
clearly in point here: 
"It cannot be questioned that Plaintiff was in 
the intersection so substantially ahead of the Defend-
ant that he clearly had the right of way, and he 
could be found by the jury to be within the standard 
of reasonable care in assuming that Defendant saw 
him and would yield the right of way, and that Plain-
tiff reasonably relied upon such assumption and 
there was nothing to warn him to the contrary until 
it was too late for him to avoid the collision." 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly found that Defendant, C. Leo 
Christensen was negligent, which negligence was the sole 
proximate cause of this accident and that Plaintiff, J. Earl 
Morris, was not contributorily negligent. Judgment of the 
lower court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RUSSELL C. HARRIS 
300 Crandall Building 
and 
L. J. SUMMERHAYS 
604-610 Boston Building 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Respondent 
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